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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case is before us on a petition by the United States 
for a writ of mandamus directing a District Judge of the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania to vacate his order 
transferring this criminal action against defendant Ruth 
Streeval to Tennessee and to refrain from transferring the 
case unless the showing and findings required by Fed. R. 
Crim. P. 21(b) have been made. At issue before us is not 
the discretionary decision to transfer vel non  but the 







On August 17, 2000, Ruth Streeval and Lollie Binkley, 
Streeval's sister, were charged by a grand jury sitting in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania in a nine-count indictment 
with mail fraud, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit mail 
fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering, and aiding and 
abetting. Binkley was also charged with money laundering 
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and criminal forfeiture. Streeval was, by agreement, 
arraigned near her residence in the Middle District of 
Tennessee due to her alleged poor health. She subsequently 
filed a motion for severance and transfer. The judge then 
presiding denied the motion on February 9, 2001. 
 
Binkley pled guilty to all counts charged, and was 
sentenced to twenty-seven months imprisonment, 
supervised release, and payment of restitution. On May 7, 
2001, Streeval, who pled not guilty, renewed her motion for 
severance and transfer to Tennessee. On May 8, 2001, the 
District Judge who now presided granted the renewed 
motion. On May 16, 2001, after a six-day stay, the District 
Court denied the government's request for reconsideration 
of the motion to transfer. On June 18, 2001, the 
government sought a writ of mandamus to compel the 
District Court to reconsider its order transferring this case 
to Tennessee. 
 
In the interim, on May 29, 2001, in accordance with Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 21(c), the Middle District of Tennessee received 
from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania a copy of the 
order severing and transferring the case, the original record 
of this case, and Streeval's indictment, which in turn was 
filed in Tennessee. The case was docketed as 01-CR-84 and 
assigned to Judge Todd Campbell, who scheduled the case 
for prompt trial. After Judge Campbell was advised of the 
challenge to the transfer and this court's decision to hear 
argument on the matter, he rescheduled the trial date to 








The most hotly contested issue, and the one that gives us 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. We are most appreciative of Judge Campbell's accommodation, which 
enabled this court to consider the matter and prevented an unseemly 
tension between federal jurisdictions. We undertook to rule on the 
appeal as promptly as possible. 
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the most pause, is that of our remaining jurisdiction. Of 
course, the District Court originally had jurisdiction over 
the criminal case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3231. This court 
has jurisdiction over a petition for a writ of mandamus 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S1651(a). Streeval and the District 
Court2 argue that courts of this circuit no longer retain 
jurisdiction in this case because it has been transferred to 
Tennessee. 
 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b), the rule that Streeval invoked in 
seeking transfer, provides that "[f]or the convenience of 
parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice, the 
court upon motion of the defendant may transfer the 
proceeding as to that defendant or any one or more of the 
counts thereof to another district." We have interpreted the 
comparable civil rule to mean that when a transfer of a 
case has been completed, " `the transferor court--and the 
appellate court that has jurisdiction over it--lose all 
jurisdiction over the case.' " White v. ABCO Eng'g Corp., 199 
F.3d 140, 143 n.4 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting 15 Charles 
Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure S 3846 at 357 
(2d ed. 1986)). Typically, the transferor court loses 
jurisdiction when the physical record is transferred. 
Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 43 F.3d 
843, 845-46 n.4 (3d Cir. 1994); Wilson-Cook Med., Inc. v. 
Wilson, 942 F.2d 247, 250 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Chrysler 
Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516- 
17 (10th Cir. 1991)). Nonetheless, in language particularly 
apt here, we have noted that "shifting papers cannot 
validate an otherwise invalid transfer." White, 199 F.3d at 
143 n.4; see also Warrick v. General Elec. Co.  (In re 
Warrick), 70 F.3d 736, 739-40 (2d Cir. 1995). Although 
White involved a civil case rather than a criminal case, and 
thus transfer was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S1404(a) rather 
than Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b), the language of Rule 21(b) was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The District Court, exercising the option accorded to it by 3rd Cir. R. 
3.1 (2001), which allows a district judge to file an opinion or 
memorandum to explain an order or decision after an appeal is taken, 
filed a memorandum that, in addition to summarizing the reasons for 
transfer, includes arguments why this court should not grant 
mandamus, more akin to an adversarial brief of a party than a "written 
amplification" of a prior order for which the Rule is designed. 
 
                                4 
 
 
taken from S1404(a) and "decisions construing that statute 
. . . provide helpful analogies" for understanding Rule 21(b). 
2 Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure S 344 (3d ed. 
2000); see also United States v. McManus, 535 F. 2d 460, 
463 (8th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Gasch, 404 F.2d 1231, 1236- 
37 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 
The government argues that this court retains 
jurisdiction because "the only document of legal 
significance, the indictment, remains in [the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania]." Br. of Government at 7. Although 
a copy of the indictment was sent to the Middle District of 
Tennessee, the indictment was retained because Streeval's 
co-defendant had pled guilty and her sentencing had not 
been concluded at that time. App. at 12-13. We need not 
evaluate this argument in light of far more compelling 
considerations.3 
 
The government argues, and we agree, that this court 
retains jurisdiction for purpose of evaluating the legitimacy 
of the transfer. In White, a magistrate judge in the 
Southern District of New York attempted to transfer a case 
to the District of New Jersey under 28 U.S.C. S 1404(a) by 
writing "so ordered" under a stipulation signed by the judge 
and the parties. This court determined that such an"inter- 
district transfer by stipulation" was invalid. White, 199 F.3d 
at 143 (emphasis omitted). We ordered the appeal 
transferred to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S1631, which allows for transfer 
from an appellate court that does not have jurisdiction to 
one that does. Id. at 145-46. Although we did not spell out 
in White general criteria for deciding when a transfer is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The government also argues that the transfer was invalid because the 
District Court's order transferred the case to the"non-existent `District 
of Tennessee.' " Br. of Government at 14. Although the District Court did 
not specify to which of the three judicial districts in Tennessee the case 
was being transferred, it was clear from the context of this case and the 
fact that Streeval was arraigned in the Middle District of Tennessee that 
the Middle District was the intended transferee district; indeed, the 
court 
clerk did send the relevant papers to that district. The government does 
not cite any case that suggests that a transfer will be invalidated on 
such a minor technical point and we are not persuaded by this aspect 
of the government's argument. 
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valid, the fact that we exercised jurisdiction over the case 
when one of the parties challenged the validity of the 
transfer demonstrates that we implicitly acknowledged our 
jurisdiction to make a determination concerning the validity 
of a transfer. 
 
The justification for this rule is clear. A district court 
cannot divest an appellate court of jurisdiction by the mere 
expedient of ordering a transfer of the file documents to any 
other district court without following procedures 
established for such a transfer. The proposition is not a 
new one. Indeed, we have asserted in numerous cases our 
retention of jurisdiction for purposes of evaluating the 
legitimacy of a transfer. See, e.g., Solomon v. Cont'l Am. Life 
Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 1043, 1045 (3d Cir. 1972) (noting "when 
the district court has acted without following appropriate 
procedural safeguards, we will . . . confine it in exercising 
that discretion"); Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 
25 (3d Cir. 1970); Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 
F.2d 267, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1962).4 
 
This is not to say that an appellate court indefinitely 
maintains jurisdiction for purposes of evaluating the 
effectiveness of a transfer. Obviously, once the transferee 
court proceeds with the transferred case, the decision as to 
the propriety of transfer is to be made in the transferee 
court. However, it is preferable that there be a process that 
allows for prompt review of the transfer by the court of 
appeals of the transferor circuit. To accomplish that, some 
courts have adopted a standard procedure of automatically 
granting a stay of a transfer for a specified period of time. 
For example, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, following 
a suggestion of this court in Swindell-Dressler , 308 F.2d at 
274 n.11, promulgated a local rule whereby a transfer order 
is automatically stayed for twenty days, absent expedition. 
See E.D. Pa. R. 3.2.5 Unfortunately, that rule does not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. While all these cases are civil cases and thus involved transfer under 
28 U.S.C. S 1404(a), as noted above, the language in rule 21(b) is 
analogous to S 1404(a). 
 
5. See, e.g., D. Conn. R. Civ. P. 18 (directing the court clerk to wait 
until 
the eleventh day following the order of transfer to mail the papers). S.D. 
& E.D.N.Y.R. Civ. P. 83.1 (requiring the court clerk to wait five days 
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extend to criminal cases. If it did, the current situation 
would have been avoided. Even in the absence of such an 
applicable local rule, and without delineating the specific 
length of time needed to allow the party resisting transfer to 
seek review by an appropriate means, the government acted 
with sufficient dispatch here that we have jurisdiction to 
consider its petition for mandamus. 
 
B. Suitability of Mandamus 
 
We turn to consider whether mandamus is an 
appropriate means to review the transfer in this case. In 
general, an order transferring a case is not a final order 
and, hence, not appealable. See, e.g., Nascone v. Spudnuts, 
Inc., 735 F.2d 763, 764 (3d Cir. 1984).6 While 28 U.S.C. 
S1651(a) grants federal courts the general power to issue 
writs, it is widely accepted that mandamus is extraordinary 
relief that is rarely invoked. See, e.g., In re Patenaude, 210 
F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Balsimo, 68 F.3d 185, 
186 (7th Cir. 1995); Solomon, 472 F.2d at 1045-46; 16 
Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure,S 2936.2, at 
667 (2d ed. 1996). In Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 
(1967), the Supreme Court discussed the exceptional 
nature of the remedy of mandamus and, in addition, 
expressed "an awareness of additional considerations which 
flow from the fact that the underlying proceeding is a 
criminal prosecution." Id. at 96. Nonetheless, the Court 
recognized that "mandamus may . . . be used [in certain 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
before transferring a case to another district); see also Roofing & Sheet 
Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 988-89 
n.10 (11th Cir. 1982); Semro v. Halstead Enters., Inc., 619 F. Supp. 682, 
683 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (noting that "the [c]lerk in this district has a 
general 
policy of holding transfer papers for at least thirty days" before 
transferring to afford non-moving party an opportunity to seek 
mandamus review); 15 Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 3846, at 357 (2d ed. 1986) (endorsing the practice of granting a stay of 
transfer in the civil context for a sufficient period to allow for an 
opportunity to file for appellate review). 
 
6. See also United States v. French, 787 F.2d 1381, 1384 (9th Cir. 1986); 
United States v. Nat'l City Lines, 334 U.S. 573, 574 (1948) ("[I]t is . . 
. 
doubtful whether the government ha[s] a right to appeal from [an] order 
of transfer in [a] criminal case."). 
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circumstances] to review procedural orders in criminal 
cases." Id. at 97. The Court did "not decide under what 
circumstances, if any, such a use of mandamus would be 
appropriate," id. at 98, but suggested as relevant to that 
decision "the constitutional precepts that a man is entitled 
to a speedy trial and that he may not be placed twice in 
jeopardy for the same offense." Id. 
 
This court has held that a writ of mandamus may issue 
to compel a district court to vacate an order transferring a 
case to another district. Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stockment, 488 
F.2d 754, 756 (3d Cir. 1973); see also Swindell-Dressler, 
308 F.2d at 271. More recently, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit held that the same rule applies in the 
criminal context. See Balsimo, 68 F.3d at 186. Although we 
have stated that mandamus relief will "rarely if ever" be 
granted directed to transfer orders, as this court has aptly 
put it, "rarely if ever d[oes] not mean never." Solomon, 472 
F.2d at 1045. Therefore, as "[m]andamus is . . . the 
appropriate mechanism for reviewing an allegedly improper 
transfer order," Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assoc., 5 
F.3d 28, 30 (3d Cir. 1994), it is appropriate for us to 
consider whether we should grant the government's petition 
for mandamus. 
 
C. The Motion to Transfer 
 
In deciding whether a writ of mandamus should issue 
with respect to an order to transfer, we must take into 
consideration that, other than mandamus, the petitioner 
has no means of adequate relief, Mallard v. United States 
Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 309 (1989) (setting out the 
showing required for issuance of mandamus), and that the 
transfer, if erroneous, may cause irreparable injury. United 
States v. Wexler, 31 F.2d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 1994). As we 
noted at the outset, the government does not attempt to 
make its arguments against the motion to transfer before 
this court. Rather, it asks us to use our mandamus power 
to require the District Court to reconsider its order 
transferring the case and, in so doing, to follow certain 
procedures. Specifically, the government requests that this 
court order the District Court to (1) require Streeval to meet 
the burden of establishing the appropriateness of transfer 
by specific evidence, (2) give the government adequate 
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opportunity to respond to Streeval's arguments and 
evidence in support of transfer, and (3) make findings and 
give reasons for its decision with respect to the transfer 
motion. 
 
In support of its petition, the government focuses on 
three cases decided by this court: Swindell-Dressler, 
Solomon and Plum Tree. In Swindell-Dressler, a district 
judge "of his own volition and without any motion or 
petition by one or any of the parties, and without hearing, 
and without giving Swindell notice or opportunity to be 
heard, . . . transferred [the case] to the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia." 
Swindell-Dressler, 308 F.2d at 271. We disapproved the 
procedure followed by the district court, holding that by 
"denying Swindell any hearing or opportunity for hearing 
the court below denied it procedural due process of law 
guaranteed to it by the Fifth Amendment." Id.  at 273-74. 
We issued a writ of mandamus. Id. at 275. 
 
In Solomon, we were again presented with a petition for 
mandamus as to an order by the district judge transferring 
a case seeking recovery on various insurance policies to the 
Middle District of North Carolina, which was the situs of 
the accident that was the subject of the suit. This court 
interpreted Swindell-Dressler as holding that "when the 
district court has acted without following appropriate 
procedural safeguards, we will by the writ [of mandamus] 
confine it in exercising that discretion to the narrow path of 
due process." Solomon, 472 F.2d at 1045. We held, 
however, that the facts presented in Solomon were 
distinguishable from Swindell-Dressler because "the district 
court proceeded after appropriate notice, and the 
petitioners opposing transfer had the opportunity to file 
opposing affidavits." Id. at 1046. Further, we stated that 
although a writ of mandamus might appropriately issue 
when a case was transferred where "nothing in the record 
indicates that the transferee district will be convenient to 
anyone," id., the Solomon case was not of that sort, and we 
thus denied the petition for mandamus. 
 
In Plum Tree, the district court granted defendants' 
motion for a transfer to the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas, even though defendants did 
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not file any supporting documents to show that a transfer 
would be appropriate. Plaintiffs, who strongly opposed the 
transfer, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus. We agreed 
with plaintiffs, commenting that "there was no evidence 
before the district court upon which it could base a finding 
that a transfer order was justified." 488 F.2d at 756. In 
particular, defendants failed to "support their motion to 
transfer with any affidavits, depositions, stipulations, or 
other documents containing facts that would tend to 
establish the necessary elements for a transfer," id. at 756- 
57, such as: 
 
       names and addresses of witnesses whom the moving 
       party plans to call, . . . affidavits showing the 
       materiality of the matter to which these witnesses will 
       testify, statements by the moving part[y] of the 
       business difficulties or personal hardships that might 
       result from . . . having to defend against the suit in the 
       district court where it was originally brought, affidavits 
       concerning the relative ease of access to sources of 
       documentary evidence, and other materials where 
       appropriate. 
 
Id. at 757 n.2. Because the district court did not have 
before it adequate grounds for ordering a transfer, we 
ordered that it vacate the order "without prejudice to the 
right of defendants on remand to renew in the district court 
their motion for transfer, with appropriate supporting 
documents." Id. at 757. 
 
Of the cases decided by this court, Plum Tree  is most 
similar to the present case. Streeval, the party requesting 
transfer, did not present "affidavits, depositions, [or] 
stipulations," id. at 756, and the District Court did not hold 
a hearing concerning the motion to transfer at which 
Streeval had the burden to establish the appropriateness of 
transfer and the government had the opportunity to 
respond to Streeval's arguments for transfer. 
 
Streeval argues that in contrast to Plum Tree , there was 
evidence in the present case to support the transfer order. 
She refers in particular to the fact that the government did 
not oppose her motion to be arraigned in Tennessee, noting 
that the FBI had observed that she appeared at her 
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arraignment in a wheelchair, and that not only is she 
herself handicapped but that she is the caretaker for her ill 
husband. She points out that the government's list of 
witnesses filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
included only some witnesses from the Philadelphia area 
but also some from Tennessee and others that are 
geographically dispersed. She also asserts, but without 
specificity, that any evidence for the defense would be 
located in Tennessee, and notes that none of the offenses is 
alleged to have been committed in Pennsylvania. App. at 
29-30. 
 
Because the government abjures arguing the merits of 
the transfer, its focus is on the procedure followed by the 
District Court before it ordered the transfer. Whether to 
transfer a case is generally committed to the discretion of 
the district courts. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 
235, 257 (1981). We have been reluctant to put specific 
requirements on the process by which the district courts 
decide motions to transfer, see, e.g., Solomon, 472 F.2d at 
1047-48; Plum Tree, 488 F.2d at 756; White, 199 F.3d at 
144, undoubtedly because of concern that imposition of 
stringent procedural hurdles might interfere unduly with 
the exercise of the courts' discretion. 
 
On the other hand, the case law suggests that there are 
certain minimum procedures that should be followed before 
ruling on a motion to transfer. It would appear evident that 
the party objecting to transfer must be given an opportunity 
to rebut the arguments and the evidence, if any, offered by 
the movant in favor of transfer. Also, it is helpful when the 
district court provides a statement of reasons for granting 
the motion to transfer so that the appellate court has a 
basis to determine whether the district court soundly 
exercised its discretion and considered the appropriate 
factors. See generally United States v. Criden , 648 F. 2d 
814, 819 (3d Cir. 1981). It is not necessary that the 
transfer order be accompanied by a lengthy statement-- 
such as the eight-page opinion in United States v. Coffee, 
113 F. Supp. 2d 751 (E.D. Pa. 2000), describing the court's 
reasons for transferring a case -- as long as there is a 
sufficient explanation of the factors considered, the weight 
accorded them, and the balancing performed. 
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Most important is that the district court's explanation for 
the transfer demonstrate that the court recognized the 
nature of the showing that must be made to support a 
transfer and the parties' respective burdens. In Platt v. 
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 U.S. 240 (1964), a 
criminal antitrust case, the Supreme Court enumerated ten 
factors that should be considered by a court in deciding 
whether to transfer a case. They are: 
 
       (1) location of [the] . . . defendant; (2) location of 
       possible witnesses; (3) location of events likely to be in 
       issue; (4) location of documents and records likely to 
       be involved; (5) disruption of defendant's business 
       unless the case is transferred; (6) expense to the 
       parties; (7) location of counsel; (8) relative accessibility 
       of [the] place of trial; (9) docket condition of each 
       district . . . involved; and (10) any other special 
       elements which might affect the transfer. 
 
Id. at 243-44 (quotation omitted). Although Platt involved a 
corporate defendant, the ten Platt factors are used in cases 
involving individual defendants as well. A balance should 
be struck among the most important factors in the 
particular case to determine whether transfer is 
appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Stephenson, 895 
F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1990). 
 
As to the burdens of proof, this court has stated in 28 
U.S.C. S 1404(a) cases that "[t]he burden is on the moving 
party to establish that a balancing of proper interests weigh 
in favor of the transfer." Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 
F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970); see also Jumara v. State Farm 
Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995); Elbeco Inc. v. 
Estrella de Plato, Corp. 989 F. Supp. 669, 679 (E.D. Pa. 
1997); 15 Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure 
S 3848, at 383 (2d ed. 1986). While the burden is on the 
defendant, the defendant is not required to show"truly 
compelling circumstances for . . . change . . . .[of venue, 
but rather that] all relevant things considered, the case 
would be better off transferred to another district." Balsimo, 
68 F.3d at 187. 
 
It is not surprising given the similarity between the 
language of S 1404(a) providing the standard governing 
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transfer of civil cases ("[f]or the convenience of parties and 
witnesses, in the interest of justice") and that of Rule 21(b) 
governing transfer of criminal cases ("[f]or the convenience 
of parties and witnesses, and in the interest of justice"), 
that the courts have held that the criminal defendant has 
the burden of making the case for transfer. See, e.g., United 
States v. Spy Factory, Inc., 951 F. Supp. 450, 464 (S.D.N.Y 
1997) (" `[T]he burden is on the moving defendant to justify 
a transfer under Rule 21(b).' ") (quoting United States v. 
Aronoff, 463 F. Supp. 454, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)); United 
States v. Washington, 813 F. Supp. 269, 275 (D. Vt. 1993); 
United States v. Long, 697 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 
1988), rev'd on other grounds 917 F.2d. 691 (2d Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Wheaton, 463 F. Supp. 1073 (S.D.N.Y. 
1979); Aronoff, 463 F. Supp. at 461; United States v. 
Ashland Oil, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 661, 665 (D. Ky. 1978) 
(denying defendant's request to transfer case to the district 
of his residence in light of his ill health because his health 
was not so severely impaired, he was not bedridden, and he 
had not been hospitalized); see also 2 Wright, Federal 
Practice and Procedure S 344, at 403 (3d ed. 2000) ("[I]t is 
proper to require the defendant, as the moving party, to 
carry the burden of showing why a transfer would serve the 
purposes specified in [Rule 21(b)]"); 25 James Wm. Moore et 
al., Moore's Federal Practice S 621.04[2], at 621 19 (3d ed. 
2001) ("To obtain a `convenience' transfer pursuant to Rule 
21(b), the defendant must show that litigating the trial in 
the district from which transfer is sought . . . either 
burdens the defense or creates undue prejudice against the 
defendant."). 
 
It is important not to overlook the Supreme Court's 
statement in Platt that a defendant is not entitled to defend 
his case in his or her home district. See Platt , 376 U.S. at 
245-46. That proposition has been frequently relied on as 
one of the bases for denying transfer in criminal cases, see, 
e.g., United States v. Bittner, 728 F.2d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1322 (11th 
Cir. 1982); United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 162 
(4th Cir. 1981). 
 
In this case, the government complains that the District 
Court granted Streeval's motion for a transfer, even before 
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the government received a copy of the motion, without 
waiting for the government's response, and that the court 
acted by filing a one-line order that gave no reasons for the 
transfer. While the government's frustration is 
understandable, these omissions would not in themselves 
warrant mandamus. Under the procedure in Swindell- 
Dressler, the government had an opportunity to put forth 
its argument in opposition to the transfer in its motion for 
reconsideration. Admittedly, it may be more difficult to 
persuade a judge that a decision already made to transfer 
the case should be vacated than it would have been to 
persuade the judge not to transfer in the first instance, but 
nothing in the record suggests that the District Court did 
not consider the government's arguments on 
reconsideration. 
 
Similarly, while the initial transfer order dated May 8, 
2001 was devoid of explanation for the decision, and the 
second order dated May 16, 2001 merely denied the motion 
to reconsider the transfer order, again without explanation, 
the District Court did use the vehicle of our Local Rule 3.1 
to file an explanatory Memorandum dated June 19, 2001. 
Once again, the sparseness of the prior orders does not 
warrant mandamus in light of the subsequent attempt to 
fill the vacuum. Mandamus is only appropriate when the 
district court has committed a clear abuse of discretion or 
clear error of law. 
 
On the other hand, it is the government's complaint that 
the District Court ordered the case transferred without 
requiring Streeval to bear the burden of establishing that 
transfer was appropriate that causes us concern. Although 
the District Court referred to many of the relevant factors, 
if in fact the court was unaware that the burden to show 
reasons for the transfer was on the defendant, then the 
misconception would be serious enough to warrant 
mandamus. The burden of proof is often the determinative 
factor in a discretionary decision, particularly in one where 
the factors may be closely balanced. It is important that an 
appellate court performing its review function be satisfied 
that the District Court recognized where the burden lay. 
Here, Streeval has not pointed to anything in the record or 
in the District Court's memorandum that indicates that the 
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District Court placed the burden on Streeval. The 
government complains, for example, that Streeval has 
neither identified nor produced documents that allegedly 
show relevant activities took place in Tennessee; that she 
has not identified witnesses in Tennessee whereas it has, 
such as Wentworth, one of the principal victims of the 
fraud, who is in or near the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania; and that she has not produced adequate 
evidence that it would be physically burdensome for her to 
be tried in Philadelphia. 
 
We recognize that the District Court may indeed have 
placed the burden on Streeval and have balanced the 
factors to reach its decision to transfer the case to the 
Middle District of Tennessee, but we have no basis to so 
hold on the record before us. Under the circumstances, we 
will remand this matter to the District Court for 
reconsideration, requiring Streeval to bear the burden of 
showing why transfer is appropriate. We express no opinion 
as to the merits of a transfer. At argument the government 
conceded that once the District Court evaluated the factors 
in light of the appropriate burden, there would be no basis 
for it to file another mandamus petition. 
 
In light of the scheduled trial date in Tennessee and our 
desire to be reciprocally accommodating to the District 
Court in Tennessee, we will direct the District Court on 
remand to require the parties promptly to present their 
arguments and supporting data, and to rule no later than 
the end of the calendar year.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. At oral argument, Streeval's counsel informed the court that her client 
was in the hospital and would be unable to attend an evidentiary 
hearing in Philadelphia. While regrettable, we do not regard this as a 
basis for delay. It is not necessary that the District Court hold an 
evidentiary hearing before ruling. Streeval may seek to meet her burden 
as to the transfer by submission of affidavits attesting to her medical 
condition and her inability to travel to a criminal trial in Philadelphia. 
 







Because we cannot be sure that the District Court 
followed appropriate procedure before transferring this case 
to Tennessee, we will issue a writ of mandamus ordering 
the District Judge to reconsider Streeval's motion to 
transfer in accordance with the procedure set out in this 
opinion. 
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